http://www.longstreath.com/community/index.php/page/index.html/_/safety/ Thu, 23 Feb 2012 02:40:46 +0000 43200 Articles devoted to diving safety. Read these they may surprise you http://www.longstreath.com/community/index.php/page/index.html/_/safety/serious-illness-cover-r32
YOU ARE MORE LIKELY TO RECEIVE A PAY OUT WITH SERIOUS ILLNESS COVER and this is how..

Hannover Life UK has estimated the likelihood of suffering a serious illness versus the traditional critical illness.
The results show that we are 75% more likely to claim on suffering a serious illness than a critical illness and this shows that the serious illness cover is 75% more likely to pay out. This is possible because your plan pays out a percentage of your pot (sum assured) based on the severity of the illness, and leaves the remaining cover in the pot providing further cover. More and more people are surviving serious illness as medical research continues to improve and this benefit takes care of you when you need it and provides a lump sum for you and your family whilst you recover.
It's as simple as that.]]> Tue, 28 Jun 2011 16:46:36 +0000 65ded5353c5ee48d0b7d48c591b8f430 http://www.longstreath.com/community/index.php/page/index.html/_/safety/tax-efficient-employment-r31 How to pay less tax and retain up to 85% of your salary? Contact me for detils. Tue, 28 Jun 2011 16:18:39 +0000 1afa34a7f984eeabdbb0a7d494132ee5 http://www.longstreath.com/community/index.php/page/index.html/_/safety/subsea-diver-suffers-freak-mishap-r29
Richard Bradley had been diving off Technip Oceania's Venturer support vessel 148km north of Dampier, where the life of the subsea infrastructure at the Cossack, Wanaea, Lambert and Hermes gas fields is being extended by 15 years.

Saturation diving is highly skilled work requiring divers to live for weeks on the surface in claustrophobic hyperbaric chambers which simulate being underwater.

Inside, they breathe a mix of helium and oxygen, remaining under the same intense pressure as the depths they are working in for the duration of the job, earning up to $3000 a day.

Mr Bradley had been inside the system for 10 days when he descended in a diving bell attached to the main chamber about 4.20pm on March 30.

With colleague Richard Sanderson, he was 40m deep cleaning marine growths off the subsea infrastructure to inspect the condition of welding when the equipment failed.

"I was using a supposedly solid, high-pressure water blaster and 20 minutes into using it, part of the stainless steel gun fell off and I took a hit," he said.

Mr Bradley's arm was ripped apart and the wound was contaminated with debris, seawater and fragments of his hot water suit.

Helped by Mr Sanderson, he dragged himself back to the diving bell along his "umbilical" - the divers' lifeline which supplies breathing gas, hot water and communication facilities.

"The first thing that went through my mind was 'I can't pass out', as one of the chief dangers is getting sucked into the thrusters of the diving boat . . . big propellers that hold the vessel on station," he said.

"But we were at a very shallow depth and that was one of the things that saved me - if we'd been at the bottom, where we were heading, it would be a five-day decompression and I would have had a massive infection."

After returning to the surface chamber, he started emergency decompression at 9pm after stabilising. If he had tried to race to the surface, he probably would have died from "explosive decompression", which was like "shaking a can of Coke" in the bloodstream.

Mr Bradley finally reached the surface at noon on Friday and was taken to Dampier and then on to Karratha Hospital, where he had surgery to clean the wound. He was then flown to Perth, where surgeons opened his arm from his elbow to his wrist to remove more dead, damaged and infected tissue.

Now he faces up to four skin grafts before undergoing rehabilitation and will be off work for at least six months. He stressed his employers had been "fantastic" and would cover his medical costs.

"In 16 years of saturation diving in some of the dirtiest and darkest countries on some of the flimsiest contracts, I have been incredibly fortunate to have an accident with a company that is looking after me," he said.

The National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority is investigating the incident.
Technip Oceania managing director Frans Roozendaal said the company was co-operating with NOPSA and conducting its own internal investigation.

Source: The West Australian]]> Tue, 05 Apr 2011 06:51:38 +0000 d1f491a404d6854880943e5c3cd9ca25 http://www.longstreath.com/community/index.php/page/index.html/_/safety/crest-odyssey-i-r27
On completion, it is said to have a diving contract in Indonesia, though this is yet to be confirmed.

Pacific Radiance have also built a Sister ship, the Crest Odyssey-2 which is scheduled to be operational by June or July this year.]]> Mon, 28 Mar 2011 02:52:33 +0000 ec5decca5ed3d6b8079e2e7e7bacc9f2 http://www.longstreath.com/community/index.php/page/index.html/_/safety/once-upon-a-time-in-chinaa-cautionary-tale-r10 ORIGINALLY POSTED BY COWBOY BOB

This is a report that some of you guys have seen or heard about. Mods--I don't know where else to put this so move it if you want to...
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H2S Poisoning of Divers in Saturation

Excerpted from a report compiled by a civilian diving accident investigator regarding H2S poisoning of three Australian sat divers. Details mechanism of accident and the failure of corporate protocols and safety culture to properly address the situation as it worsened over the course of approximately four weeks to a point where the diving supervisor at last terminated the sat run.


April 19, 2001

Regarding diving-related injuries received by [name removed] while he was working for [name removed], on the Diving Support Vessel (DSV) [name removed], in the waters off the coast of the Republic of China, in May and June, of 1998.


SUMMARY OF EVENTS

It is my understanding that [name removed] was hired by [name removed], effective May 5, 1998. Between the dates of May 6th and May 18th, he and other diving personnel were exposed, repeatedly, to poisonous gases, not the least of which were high concentrations of hydrogen sulfide (H2S), while working on the deck of the [name removed], and while working from the vessel, in the water, as a diver. During this period, two surface divers suffered from decompression sickness attributed to their exposure to H2S, one of whom was rendered unconscious upon exiting the water from a dive, on May 9th. [name removed] management, all the way to the Director of Safety, in Houston, Texas, was made aware of this situation from the date of the first exposure.

On the morning of May 18th, [name removed] and three other saturation divers blew down in the chamber, to a storage depth of 110 fsw, and commenced a �sat� from which he would not emerge until 06:00, on the morning of June 16th..

Bell Run #1 was made at the Whezou 11-4-A platform, and then the [name removed] relocated to the Barge HD-423, working at the Pigable Y location. By Bell Run #3, on May 19th, the divers were reporting headaches, nausea and vomiting, both during their excursions, and after returning to the chamber. The circumstances, as they were understood at the time by the personnel onboard the vessel, were reported directly to the Singapore and Houston offices of [name removed], including this comment: An interesting phenomena of the seabed and water condition at 11-4-A platform is that metal rigging and chain hoists come back to the surface stripped of paint and rust as if they had been immersed in an acid bath.

Saturation excursions continued at these lethal locations, the WZ 11-4-A platform and the Pigable Y, until 16:48, on May 20th, after divers experienced breathing difficulty during Bell Run #6. After receiving no guidance or information from corporate [name removed] on how to interpret the information, or how to respond to the situation, the Diving Superintendent, [name removed], notified the Chinese Company Man that no further work could be carried out at this location, until procedures are established for divers working in this heavily polluted area.�

Despite the severity of their symptoms, the seriousness of exposure to poisonous gases, and the need for medical attention and treatment, these ailing divers were confined to saturation, harnessed to their work, and continued to make excursions at other locations. After leaving these locations, and working at the Whezou Island SPM location, the severest of their symptoms subsided, but the damage had been done.

During the following weeks, the vessel and crew were directed to various locations where they would observe large bubbles of gas ascending to the water�s surface, emitting noxious odors, and leaving a brown scum on the surface of the water, and where personnel on the deck of the vessel would observe fish that would die immediately upon swimming through fluids discharged from a drilling rig. Then, on June 4th, 1998, during Bell Run #22, two of [name removed]�s fellow saturation divers were overwhelmed, and nearly killed, by exposure to poisonous gases. From the date of his first exposure, at the 11-4-A platform, and for the remainder of this saturation dive (�sat�), [name removed] would be spitting out fillings from his teeth, and complaining of abdominal pain.


Description of Saturation Diving

The necessity of Saturation Diving results from the extensive decompression time that accompanies each relatively short Bottom Time executed from the Surface Diving mode. For example, a gas dive, in the Surface Diving mode, to a depth of 167 fsw, for a maximum of 77 minutes of working time (Bottom Time), requires in-water decompression of about 120 minutes, plus approximately 3 hours of surface decompression in a Deck Decompression Chamber (DDC). This is an extremely costly process to get about one hour and fifteen minutes of working time out of a diver for every three and a half hours of the day. This adds up to about eight hours of Bottom Time for every twenty-four hour day.

The profile for a Saturation Dive starts when the divers (in pairs made up of bell partners) blow down in a hyperbaric chamber(s) to somewhere in the vicinity of their working depth. From their temporary home, in the decompression chamber(s), they transfer under pressure (TUP) to working depth via a submersible diving bell, for periods of about eight hours at a shift, during which, each bell partner works outside of the bell for the period of a four hour excursion. Using this technique, two teams of two bell partners can achieve in excess of sixteen hours of Bottom Time for each diving day. This process continues, day after day, for the duration of the sat, which commonly lasts up to thirty days. During the last few days of the sat, the divers complete one prolonged period of decompression, thus avoiding the hours of decompression, each and every day, required for Surface Diving.

There are other factors that enhance the value of Saturation Diving, as compared to Surface Oriented Diving. There is the increased, and cumulative, risk of Decompression Sickness associated with decompressing from surface dives, day after day. Further, there are economic advantages to Saturation Diving, not the least of which is the capability of recovering a large percentage of the divers breathing gas, through gas reclamation systems, where the gas is recovered from the working diver, cleaned-up, and re-circulated to the diver, over, and over, again. This is especially desirable when the diving operations are conducted in remote parts of the world.


HOW DID THE POISONOUS H2S GET TO THE DIVERS?

It seems obvious that the hydrogen sulfide gas was a byproduct of the petroleum products produced from drilling and/or production operations being conducted at the sites. There is repeated reference to the platforms discharging toxic materials into the water, or directly onto the diving vessel.

Coming Out of Solution

The information FAXed to the vessel by [name removed], and the MSDS information that I have accessed, clearly describe the characteristic of hydrogen sulfide that it is water soluble. The toxic chemical cocktail that was being dumped into the ocean around the platforms allowed the poison to disperse, and dissolve in the water, or saturate the mud on the seabed. From this point, exposure could be through the skin, immersed in the water, or through the lungs via inhalation of the gases that come out of solution, returning to the gaseous form.

When exposed to air at sea level, or to the gas bubble formed by the diving bell, the hydrogen sulfide tends to come out of solution from the water. This is why the divers and deck crew initially smelled the gas (rotten egg smell, in lower concentrations). As a result, the gas would accumulate, where it was then trapped inside of the bell, and continue to concentrate during the approximately eight hour long bell runs.

Also, as the diver and his umbilical collect contaminated mud from the seabed, the mud is carried back to the diving bell. Efforts to wash the mud off of the diver and his equipment agitate, and release the poisonous vapour from the mud, and into the bell.

There is a breathing gas scrubber that re-circulates the gas inside of the bell, forcing it through a scrubber material (SodaSorb), and removes carbon dioxide from the bell atmosphere. This prevents the divers in the bell from exposure to high (and deadly) levels of carbon dioxide. This system, however, does not remove hydrogen sulfide from the gas, so the H2S simply re-circulates inside of the bell, becoming more and more concentrated as bottom time passes.


Gas Bubbles

Gas bubbles were observed rising through the water, emitting noxious odours, and leaving behind an oily brown residue on the water's surface. These bubbles are an obvious and direct source of poisonous gas. If these bubbles could be observed rising at the ocean�s surface, then they surely were rising to the water's surface at the mouth of the diving bell.


Diver's Breathing Gas Reclamation (Concentrating the Poison)

What little guidance that was given to the crew of the [name removed], in the early stages of this situation, included avoidance of providing breathing supply to the divers from the low pressure air compressors. The compressors would be sucking in the foul, poison-contaminated air, compressing it, and pumping it down to the divers. This was probably the best advice that was received on the vessel. This led, initially, to the use of compressed, medical-grade air to supply the surface divers, but this is a costly alternative in such a remote part of the world. The logistics of transporting high pressure (HP) air to the vessel are costly, in time, assets, and in real dollars.

The other option was to utilize the gas reclamation system which re-captures the diver's exhaled gas, cleans it up, dries it out, re-pressurizes it, and re-circulates it back to the diver. Idealistically, this is a closed-circuit system. It was assumed that no contamination would get into the gas system, and, therefore, the diver would have an economical, and safe, source of breathing gas.

Unfortunately, these systems are far from perfect under these circumstances. Water does get into the diver's helmet, most commonly from around his neck dam. This water is picked up by the return side of the diver�s helmet, and sent back to the reclamation system. The system is designed to remove two things: water and carbon dioxide. Nothing else. The process of heating the gas, either with heaters in the system, to make the carbon dioxide-absorbing agent (SodaSorb) work more effectively, or by the simple process of compressing the gas, to send it back to the storage bottles, vaporizes any water content in the reclaimed gas. The person who developed this gas reclamation system, [name removed], testified, in deposition, that 'We try to keep [the temperature] above a minimum, and I think it�s 550 degrees Fahrenheit, or thereabouts.'

The water is captured as it condenses, and purged from the system. The unfortunate result is, when the water is vaporized, it releases any gases in the water. These gases, including the poisonous hydrogen sulfide, are not removed by the system. Therefore, they are concentrated by the system, as they are re-circulated to the divers, again, and again.

This process was never addressed by corporate [name removed], even though it was disclosed, by [name removed], in his daily report of May 20th, wherein he stated, 'Problem with this toxic mud is exacerbated when diver on reclaim.' The poisonous hydrogen sulfide gas was being concentrated by the gas reclamation system, and then it was supplied right back to the diver.


ANALYSIS OF ERRORS

There are three areas of responsibility associated with the management of accidents that I will address in this report.

Prior to mobilization for this project, the hazards associated with the tasks and the work site(s) should have been evaluated, and appropriate training should have been given to all personnel mobilizing to this job. This should have taken place before the vessel and crew arrived at the first work site and, certainly, before commencement of work. Personnel must be able to recognize the hazards with which they might be faced, and, if the hazards cannot be avoided (which should be the first priority), have the knowledge and equipment to respond, once they are encountered.

Secondly, when pre-planning fails to shield personnel from exposure, whether it comes in the form of physical injury, or from exposure to some unseen agent, like the destructive forces associated with poisonous gases, there must be a plan of action in place to minimize the affects of exposure. Most commonly, this is in the format of (1) remove the victim(s) from the exposure, and (2) treat the victim(s) to eliminate, or reduce, the long term damage.

Finally, it is necessary to submit the victim(s) to medical evaluation, to determine what damage has been done, and take corrective action, in the form of treatment, whenever residual effects are apparent. Responsible treatment also comes in the form of preventative therapy, even when visible damage is not evident at the time of medical evaluation.


Lack of Training

In a memorandum, dated April 23, 1998, [name removed], C.E.O. of [name removed], described the responsibilities of the Director of Safety. [name removed] (the Director of Safety) was promoted to this position, on April 1, 1998. In this memo, [name removed] (the CEO) stated, 'In his new capacity [name removed] (the Director of Safety) is responsible for creating programs and measuring their effectiveness in order to help us prevent ALL ACCIDENTS. This will include training and testing EVERYONE in [name removed] (the Dive Contractor) in order to create the Safest Environment possible'.

When reviewing the records of e-mail and FAX correspondence regarding this incident, it becomes clear that the crew on the [name removed] had no prior training, and no knowledge of the existence of poisonous gases in the areas that they were to conduct their operations. They were totally unfamiliar with the hazards associated with, or the proper response to, any exposure to hydrogen sulfide, or any other poisonous gases.

[name removed], the Life Support Technician on the [name removed], testified that there was neither training, nor any information on hydrogen sulfide made available to personnel, either before, or after starting this project, until some rather sketchy information was received 'right near the end of the job.' He said, 'We had nothing from [name removed] at the time of the job, about H2S.' Beyond the most basic knowledge that hydrogen sulfide gas 'smells like rotten eggs,' the crew's knowledge of H2S exposure limits, symptoms, potential ill effect, or treatment, was non-existent.

It appears from the records, that the crew went on hire on May 5th, and traveled to China. They rendezvoused with the [name removed] (vessel), in the Chinese port of Behai, at 11:45, on May 6th, and the vessel departed the port four hours later. After a few hours at a barge to transfer materials, the vessel made the transit to the first work site, the WZ 11-4-A platform, and moored-up to commence work the next morning.

Training is a key responsibility of the Director of Safety, [name removed]. Yet, the personnel onboard the [name removed] were allowed to commence a project in a hydrogen sulfide rich area without any training in how to recognize, or respond, to the problem.


Lack of Information

It is my understanding that a 12-page FAX was sent to the [name removed], with rather generalized information on hydrogen sulfide. [name removed], the Director of Safety for [name removed], sent this information on June 11th, 1998, over a month after the first exposure of diving personnel on the vessel.

It would seem that a more readily accessible source of information would have existed within the libraries of data maintained by [name removed] (the dive contractor). Technical Report #6 (TR-6), 'Report on Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S),' is located in the 'Technical Report Manual,' Volume III of [name removed]'s Diving Manual, (dated August 1985). Further guidelines may have been available in the training guidelines compiled by the [name removed] (dive contractor's marine division).

Another readily available source of useful information for those exposed, or who could be exposed to toxic materials, is the Material Safety Data Sheet(s) (MSDS). The MSDS provides information on exposure limits, symptoms of exposure, First Aid measures, and even guidance for treating those who have been exposed. There is no evidence to suggest that [name removed] management ever accessed this source of information, or that it was made available to the personnel on the [name removed], either before, or after it became known that there was exposure to toxic chemicals.

In fact, this information, contained in the FAX, the MSDS, and the information already available in the Technical Report Manual and Training Guidelines, should have been offered as a basis for the aforementioned training, the �personnel orientation,� before work commenced on the [name removed].


Inappropriate Information

The information contained in the reports sent by [name removed] (the Director of Safety) is frightening for those working on the deck of the vessel, or on the platform or rig. [name removed], testified in deposition that, had he and his team-mates on the vessel known of the hazards associated with their exposure to hydrogen sulfide, 'We all would have wanted to go home.'

Unfortunately, even if all of this information had already been on the vessel, or if it was sent in a timely manner, after the first exposure, it was grossly inadequate for diving operations. The information focuses on airborne exposure, and simply does not address the exposure of divers, working under increased hyperbaric pressure, to an already lethal concentration of poisonous gas.

This is a diving vessel. Information on breathing gases, and especially poisonous gases, must take into consideration the affects of the gas on personnel working at increased hyperbaric pressure. These divers were living and working at four times the pressure of those who were on deck, and it can be assumed that the adverse affects are multiplied accordingly.

Relevant information, for diving operations, must address: How to detect the gas in the diver�s working environment, and in the gases that he breathes. How to avoid exposure, how to reduce the affects after exposure, and, how to treat the victim(s) of exposure.

[name removed] (The Director of Safety � Ed.) had previous experience, or at least knowledge, with regard to hydrogen sulfide, or diving in hazardous environments. He was trained in Hazardous Materials Management in 1996. He attended a 40-hour course in HAZWOPR training in 1997. He had even authored and presented a paper (specifically considering diving and materials hazardous to health at an industry convention. (Identifying details removed.))

If the training and information that [name removed], the Director of Safety, had at his fingertips was not directly applicable to diving operations, it was his responsibility, delegated to him by the President and C.E.O. of [name removed], to fill that gap. Pertinent information, that targets the operations in which his personnel were engaged, should have been made available to his personnel. Diving was the primary activity of the [name removed] (vessel). [name removed] (The Director of Safety � Ed.) made no information available to the personnel working on the vessel prior to mobilization, to prepare them for a potentially deadly situation. Worse yet, when the information was finally sent, and not until over a month after the first exposure to hydrogen sulfide gas, it did not directly address the situation that had taken place. Specifically, it lacked any guidance whatsoever for those who encounter hydrogen sulfide in the water, or in the chambers.


Lack of Monitoring Equipment

I am frequently asked, at pre-bid meetings with diving contractors, if there is any risk of exposure to H2S at the work location. It seems obvious that this question was never asked, neither during the bidding process, nor during the preparations to mobilize crew and equipment.

It would seem prudent, especially in an area of so many unknowns, as in China, to analyze the gas being delivered to the diver(s) for this all-too-common gas. However, it is essential to analyze the diver�s gas after it is known that poisonous gas is prevalent.

Basic H2S detectors were sent to the vessel, on about May 13th, about four days after the first exposure (unconscious diver). These were intended for the protection of the personnel working on the deck of the vessel, along with breathing apparatus (BA�s). There seemed to be more concern over the cost of the BA's than for the safety of the personnel. However, no effective measures were taken to check the gas being pumped down to the divers.

It is a simple matter to install a detector at the sampling point on the gas delivery panel, inside of the diving control van. This should have immediately been recognized by someone supposedly trained and knowledgeable in how to deal with hazardous materials (e.g. poisonous gases), as was [name removed] (the Director of Safety). There was, however, no consistent or effective monitoring for this deadly gas in the diver�s breathing supply, at any point in the system.


Timeliness of Communication

There was some discussion, during the deposition of [name removed] (the dive supervisor � Ed.), about the hours at which he was making phone calls, or sending FAXes to Houston, and expecting a response. In [name removed]'s Diving Operations Manual, Volume I, in the section entitled 'First Aid and Diving Medical Emergency Handbook', it clearly states, �The Safety/Medical Division of [name removed] maintains a 24 hours per day diving medical watch throughout the year. Contact details of all emergency support personnel for each operation are publicized in the [name removed] (guidelines for support in time of emergency).


I have personally reviewed this document, for other geographic areas of the world, and [name removed], as the Director of Safety, is at the top of the chain of communications. His name is listed at the top of the contacts list. Surely, his office knows what to do with an urgent plea for assistance, even if they don't get to look at the FAX until they come into the office, first thing in the morning. There is about a fourteen hour time difference between where the [name removed] was working and the Houston offices of [name removed]. [name removed] (The dive supervisor.)was reporting the emergency conditions, pretty much as they occurred. The concern over [name removed] (the dive supervisor's) reports being delayed by a few hours pales in comparison to the 30-day delayed response from [name removed] (the Director of Safety).


Lack of Response to Mayday Calls

What is an emergency? In [name removed] (the diving contractor�s protocols for responding to emergencies), an emergency is defined as, "Any situation arising which requires immediate support and advice from Safety Department and / or other support personnel."

In [name removed]'s Diving Operations Manual, (identifying section title and corporate reference removed) it states, 'Occasion for requesting a Diving Medicine Specialist opinion' When there is uncertainty about the diagnosis' [name removed], the Project Manager on the [name removed] (name of vessel), [name removed], [name removed]'s Safety Officer in Singapore, and others, made repeated attempts to get the attention of, and to solicit guidance from, the office of [name removed]'s Director of Safety, [name removed], but to no avail.

[name removed]'s Safety Manual, of which I have had the recurrent responsibility to review during my exposure to [name removed] diving operations, all over the world, describes the company's 'open door policy.' The wording of the document states that 'The Safety Group is obliged to investigate all reports relating to safety being compromised and a formal response to the originator is guaranteed. Any employee who considers the response to his report of a safety infringement unsatisfactory, may appeal to the Director of Safety, or ultimately have it referred to the President and Chief Executive Officer of [name removed].'


This 'guarantee' leaves one with the question: To whom can you take your grievance, if the perpetrators of the infringement are the Director of Safety and the C.E.O. of the company? I can only assume that that is the purpose of this litigation. [name removed], the Project Manager on the [name removed] (name of vessel), had repeated emergencies in which he was uncertain about the diagnosis, and needed immediate support and advice from [name removed]'s Safety Department. The response was inadequate, at best, and, all too often, non-existent.


Exposure Limits Exceeded

In the Health Hazards Alert, FAXed to the [name removed] on June 13th, limits are defined, establishing maximum short term exposure limits (STEL) for hydrogen sulfide. This information is also readily available, and clearly defined, in the MSDS for hydrogen sulfide. The STEL for H2S is defined as the maximum level of the poisonous gas to which a worker can be exposed for a maximum of eight hours at a time. This STEL limit is established at 15 parts per million (ppm).

A higher exposure of 50 ppm is permitted, but the exposure time is reduced to only 10 minutes, and this is allowed only once per day, if no other measurable exposure occurs. Compare these limits with the lab analyses reported back to [name removed]. On May 26th, China Corelab Ltd., sent test results that indicated levels of hydrogen sulfide at 161.4 ppm from the mud samples sent from one of the work. Keep in mind that these were aged samples, and that some of the H2S had surely dissipated by the time the samples reached the lab.

The crew on the [name removed] analyzed a mud sample, with the MSA analyzers on the vessel, on May 30th, and discovered levels of H2S at 530 ppm.

A test report from Hench Public Marine and Cargo Survey, dated June 3rd, returned levels of H2S content at an unbelievable 6,300 ppm.

In a handwritten Accident Report, compiled by [name removed] (one of the divers), on June 4th, it was disclosed that the bellman who was rendered unconscious in the bell, on Bell Run #22, smelled no gas prior to passing out. This suggests pollutant levels of H2S in excess of 200 ppm. Source: MSDS.

Taking into consideration that the average bell run was in the vicinity of 8-hours duration, these levels of exposure are, quite frankly, and literally, criminal, if occupational safety standards were enforced.

Failure to Provide Routine Neurological and Hyperbaric Medical Examination It is routine practice within the commercial diving industry that any diver who has displayed what could be interpreted as serious symptoms of decompression sickness (i.e. nausea, vomiting, unconsciousness, etc.) undergo a thorough neurological examination, at the onset of symptoms, upon treatment for, and recovery from the symptoms. Subsequent to initial treatment, thorough medical examination, by a qualified hyperbaric medical specialist, is prescribed prior to his (or her) return to hyperbaric exposure.

Serious symptoms, to any diver, translate into �central nervous system� (CNS) decompression sickness. Serious symptoms were exhibited by [name removed], as well as by those divers who accompanied him in the saturation chambers, and should have been interpreted as central nervous system disorders. This cries for termination of the saturation dive, specialized hyperbaric treatment, and consultation with experienced hyperbaric medical specialists. It is not prudent for a diver who has displayed these symptoms to simply continue a dive (saturation), as though nothing had gone wrong. These divers should have been decompressed as soon as their problems were diagnosed, under the guidance of qualified medical specialists.

Upon completion of all possible treatment on the vessel, [name removed] should have been sent to a qualified hyperbaric specialist. Any prudent and proper treatment demands that further medical evaluation be included in the process. No effort was made to submit [name removed] to any such medical examination. He was simply kept in the saturation chamber, and required to make numerous subsequent bell runs. To continue to expose him, and the other divers, to hyperbaric conditions after experiencing serious symptoms during a dive radically increases the probability of recurring, and possibly more severe illness, whether decompression-related, or as a result of toxic exposure.

When [name removed] was demobilized from the job, after it was recognized that his illness was related to hydrogen sulfide exposure, he was not directed to a qualified toxicologist, in spite of the fact that he was still complaining of residual symptoms of his exposure at that time.


Potentially Inadequate Decompression

After it was concluded that the divers had suffered repeated exposure to hydrogen sulfide, and that their symptoms might not have been directly related to decompression, consideration should have been given to the characteristics of hydrogen sulfide exposure that reduce the body's ability to properly metabolize oxygen. One of the documents sent to the [name removed] (DSV � Ed.), on June 11th, by [name removed] (the Director of Safety), states, 'The chemical binds to citochrome oxidase. These effects are greatest in the tissues with high oxygen demands such as the central nervous system.'

After being exposed to the poisonous gases, it should not have simply been assumed that the divers would decompress properly at standard decompression rates. The reduced effectiveness of their bodies to metabolize oxygen might have, and may have, contributed to their deteriorating condition after the dive. This, too, requires advice from qualified hyperbaric specialists.


Failure to Provide Hyperbaric Oxygen

Buried amongst the jumble of information FAXed to the [name removed] (DSV), on June 11th, was the recommendation that, 'High concentrations of oxygen are recommended and hyperbaric oxygen has been used in severe cases.' This was echoed in the MSDS that I accessed during my review of this case, where it says, 'Hyperbaric oxygen may be given to those who continue to be symptomatic after standard therapy.'

It must be noted that this was a diving operation. Hyperbaric therapy was a part of their day-to-day activity. Hyperbaric treatment was a routine part of decompression, and a necessary response to incidents of decompression sickness ('bends'). The equipment necessary for hyperbaric therapy was standard, and mandatory, to the diving equipment spread. Therefore, this highly effective method of treatment for anything from burns on the skin, to emphysema, to gas gangrene, and, yes, to exposure to poisonous gases, was readily available on the [name removed] (DSV � Ed.).

However, there was no follow-up treatment of the ailing divers. The problem with this type of treatment is that it must be timely. Damaging conditions can be reversed, if they are addressed, and treated promptly. Unfortunately, if the damaging conditions are not treated in the early stages, then permanent damage may result. Even if there is uncertainty about the benefits of hyperbaric oxygen therapy, there is no risk involved. There is absolutely nothing to lose by treating a patient with hyper-oxygenation, only potential gain.

Even with the capability to treat the ailing divers at their fingertips, and with the information in their hands that prescribed treatment, no action was taken to guide the supervisors to this form of therapy. Simply FAXing a dozen pages of vaguely relevant information to the boat does not provide the guidance and direction that was needed by these men. This is where the advice and guidance of a qualified hyperbaric specialist is clearly required.


Failure to Provide Medical Guidance during the Emergency

On May 9th, after the first exposure incident, [name removed] (the dive supervisor) sent a question to the corporate offices of [name removed]: 'Can exposure to H2S cause problems with cumulative affects?

On May 19th, [name removed] (the dive supervisor) sent a FAX to [name removed] (the Director of Safety), stating, 'I am reluctant to continue diving operations, until I have some advice on cause and effect of diving in these conditions.'

On May 21st, (the dive supervisor) sent the comment that he was sending mud samples for analysis, and said, 'Please have these analysed (sic) and medical opinion on harmful effects of contents. Need results soonest.'

On May 28th, he sent the comment, 'We can't keep exposing our divers to toxic hazards, the effects of which we have little knowledge.'

On May 30th, he said, 'Still awaiting full details of mud analysis. Does it contain toxins other than H2S? A qualified medical opinion would also be appreciated.'

On June 4th, after another near-fatal encounter of the divers with poisonous gases, [name removed] (the dive supervisor) sent a note in the daily report, obviously directed at placating the Chinese clients. In it he said, '[name removed] (the dive contractor) is seeking world wide advice on the identification, cause, effect and antidote to these toxins.' I believe he was mislead, or ill-advised, but this is obviously what he believed that [name removed] (the dive contractor) was doing on behalf of the divers.

All of these pleas for medical advice, in addition to frequent comments and communication referring to the serious problems they were encountering, almost on a daily basis, and the first material response from the office of the Director of Safety was an e-mail to the Asian offices of Singapore (I do not know if this was ever received by the [name removed] (vessel).), which suggested that the problem 'Could be acid or petroleum based mud', and 'recommended the used of barrier skin creams and dry suits to protect the divers.' Over a month after the first exposure, a 12-page FAX with mostly useless information on hydrogen sulfide, including a paper on drinking water polluted with H2S, was sent to the vessel. I have observed no evidence that qualified medical advice was ever sought out, or provided to the crew of the [name removed]. Not once was one of the qualified diving medical specialists who routinely consult with [name removed] (the diving contractor), on all manner of diving-related problems, consulted for advice or guidance on the problems being encountered on the vessel, or subsequent to their poisoning. It is simply amazing that [name removed] was never referred by [name removed] to a qualified toxicologist, or even a hyperbaric medical specialist. It wasn't until approximately two years after his exposure to deadly levels of hydrogen sulfide that he was referred to specialists by his legal counsel.


Responsibility

Who are the responsible persons within the organization of [name removed]? [name removed]'s Safety Manual states, 'The President and Chief Executive Officer (Mr. [name removed]) of [name removed], personally heads the Safety Organization and is accountable directly to the Board of Directors for the Safety Performance of the Group. The President has delegated the responsibility for the management of Group safety matters to the Director of Safety ([name removed]).'

The importance of this direct link is evident in [name removed]'s corporate structure. The Director of Safety sits next to the top of every version of the company's organograms. There is no one between him and the President and C.E.O. of the company. The purpose of this direct link emphasizes the intention that Safety should be the number one priority, even before profit.

The Director of Safety is responsible 'for the implementation of Safety Policies and Procedures throughout the Company and its affiliates. He is also responsible for the management and conduct of ALL members of the Safety Group.' The manual also states, 'In the practical application of the Safety Management Group to the Company's Operations the Safety Department is authorised (sic) to require the cessation of work in any circumstances where the safe working practices are deemed to have been compromised.'

As soon as he became aware of this problem, and of the needs of the divers, it became [name removed] (the Director of Safety's) responsibility, his duty, to respond. As soon as he became aware that the divers were in distress, and that they were, in fact, in harm's way, he should have ordered the job shut down, and taken action to ensure that they received adequate and appropriate treatment and medical care. He did nothing but sit back, in his Houston office, half way around the world from this boat full of desperate personnel, especially the divers who suffered the most damaging effects, and assume that someone else was taking care of the situation. (Removed - various references to internal documents)

[name removed] (The Director of Safety) was completely aware of this responsibility, and stated, in deposition, that he 'had the ultimate authority to shut down anything [he] thought was dangerous'.

Likewise, the person who is directly 'accountable to the Board of Directors for the Safety Performance of the Group,' the President and Chief Executive Officer of [name removed], cannot sit back and assume that the person to whom he has delegated this 'responsibility for the management of Group Safety matters,' [name removed], is fulfilling his responsibility. He cannot simply forward pleas from ailing divers to his delegate, with a note, '[name removed] Let's discuss', and forget about the problem.

What was 'discussed?' It is obvious by the correspondence that nothing was resolved in the interest of [name removed] (the stricken diver). No pro-active action was ever taken to correct the chronic problems that he has suffered as a result of their incompetence, irresponsibility, and unprofessionalism.


SUMMARY

I believe that the testimony and documentation I have reviewed supports the allegations contained in the complaint for the above-referenced matter. This is my preliminary opinion, and, in light of the shear volume of information associated with this matter, I reserve the right to amend my opinion after further and continued review and analysis.


Sincerely,
[name removed] (The investigator)]]> Fri, 26 Nov 2010 13:33:32 +0000 5f93f983524def3dca464469d2cf9f3e http://www.longstreath.com/community/index.php/page/index.html/_/safety/the-brutal-killing-of-diver-mukesh-r9 POSTED BY SANTOSH - DEC 2009

This is to inform you all about the recent brutal killing of a diver who was working under a dam 120ft under water using air supplied with a pipe hose and demand valve like scuba.Please follow this link-

http://www.telegraph...ry_11871258.jsp

The diver Mukesh died on 15 December after struggling for more than 36hrs.His leg was trapped in suction where delta P was too great to remove his legs by himself.He was working in Purulia power plant reservoir in West Bengal,India

Following are the things which were missing when the diving was conducted.

1-The diver was using Tullu (Simply air supplied with pipe and the diver breaths with the pipe).No DSI etc or any back up.

2-None of the staff had carried out any risk assessment which is a must for dam or any diving.I am sure that they even don't know what the risk assessment is.

3-There was no communication available with diver as he was simply using demand supply and no helmet.It was basically a scuba type dive.

4-The so called rescue divers were unqualified and least paid divers with onshore diving experience and none of them had ever used a diving helmet.When they reached at the dive site after around 30hrs they were asking each other to go and rescue.No coordination.

5-He survived for more than a day and I am sure that a rescue team should not take more that this time even to come from UK.As a matter of fact there was no preplanned rescue plan.No actual rescue attempt was undertaken since it was not planned.

6-Every one including diving manager or the head of the hydro power plant are busy saving their ass and so very gently blaming something or someone else other than them.

7-The diver was being paid more or less 20USD as day rate.

8-The power plant earns more than 50 million INR daily while it hesitates to pay a meager amount for emergency and back up during accidents like this.

9- The biggest and most sad thing about India is we conduct 99 out of 100 onshore dives without any helmet and only with scuba sets-Sometimes upto 120ft.

10-There is no dedicated diving division on board any of these dams and the dam guys or officials treat with divers like dogs and slaves.

Just imagine the pain and frustration the diver had suffered in those 36hrs.Today when we all are shouting about non conventional source of energy and the dams are a source of electricity without any carbondioxide emission ,why cannot we ensure the safety and regulation when we carry out diving on dams.The electricity generated by dams gives good chunks of money and enough for the these companies to buy good helmets and communication sets and to hire qualified personnel.

I would like to ask one question -Can we ensure that only IMCA companies get the contracts for such dives since these power plants earn enough money to pay them.Can someone please tell me how to ensure this or how to force governments to ensure that this happens.I am ready to go to any extent if required.

I am available for further communication.

Regards
Santosh
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