Taken directly from a post on longstreath.com
Attached is text of an OGP diver fatality report that has just been released.
Unless there were two fatalities in Curacao last October involving cleaning/ship's husbandry, this relates to the death of Paul de Waal who was reported to be working with Miami divers on a cruise liner (The Norwegian Stat) that had been damaged in an earlier incident in Bermuda (The date in the OGP report appears to be incorrect, Paul de Waal was killed on Monday 29th October).
All that the press reported at the time was that the Dutch diver was working with three others when he 'gave a signal to his colleagues and was found unconscious on the harbour bed and that CPR was unsuccessful'.
The OGP have identified details that reveal an entire catalogue of failings that turn this fatality into some of the saddest reading we have seen in years.
How was this hidden? Not even a hint of any of this in the public domain, a diver killed under these circumstances and we hear not whisper?
Well done to the OGP for this one, as to people involved, shame on you (And that is all I dare say for fear of going over the top, this is one horrible set of circumstances)
OGP Safety Alert
DIVING FATALITY - SHIP HUSBANDRY- CURACAO, OCTOBER 2012
Country: CURACAO - South America
Location: ---
Incident Date: 1 October 2012 Time: ---
Type of Activity: Diving, Subsea, ROV
Type of Injury: Water related, Drowning
Function: ---
Lessons learned from a diving incident that occurred on a non OGP member site.
A routine surface supplied diving operation was undertaken to clean marine growth from a vessel hull. This involved using a hull cleaning device with rotating brushes, termed a brush cart, and this also required a diver to guide and operate it.
The brush cart contained diver operated tooling that was actuated by an air driven piston. Standard company practice was to use the suit inflation take off from the diving mask for this purpose.
Prior to this dive the diving mask was changed to a model that did not contain a suit inflation take off capability.
A decision was made to connect the diver's emergency gas supply line ( Bailout) directly to the brush cart tooling. This resulted in the diver having no personal emergency gas supply.
During the dive the diver's gas supply line (umbilical) was caught in the wheels of the brushcart and the diver experienced a reduction in breathing gas. The diver, having no emergency gas supply, removed his mask, immediately losing communication to the surface team and was observed in distress at the surface.
The surface team was composed of a radio operator (a diver) and a tender for the diver (non diver) and a diving supervisor who was not on the site at this time.
An attempt was made to pull the diver back using the diver's umbilical, this was ineffective. The radio operator, who was also the standby diver, jumped into the water without diving equipment and attempted to rescue the diver. The brush cart was negatively buoyant and the rescue diver was unable to prevent it sinking with the diver attached.
The standby diver returned to the vessel and dressed into the standby diver's equipment (SCUBA) and recovered the body of the diver from the seabed.
What Went Wrong?:
Risks with the work equipment were not identified and addressed
Critical Safety equipment was misused to achieve the work task
Personnel levels were inadequate
No onsite supervision
Inadequate Emergency recovery equipment
Corrective Actions and Recommendations:
Utilise the OGP report 411, Diving Recommended Practice (direct download here) as the baseline standard for diving.
Verify contractors are in compliance.
Establish that adequate risk assessments have been carried out
Ensure minimum personnel levels for diving are 5. One supervisor who cannot leave the dive site, a diver, a diver's tender, a standby diver and standby diver's tender. All personnel should be diver qualified and competent.
Verify emergency breathing supply equipment is of suitable volume and immediately available.
Confirm that any use of the divers breathing gas supply for tooling power is unacceptable
Ensure the standby diver's equipment is the same as the divers
Verify that while any diver is in the water, the standby diver is dressed and in immediate readiness to carry out a rescue.
Ensure emergency recovery equipment and procedures are adequate to achieve recovery
Verify emergency drills have been carried out to test the emergency recovery procedures with the diving team.
safety alert number: 248
OGP Safety Alerts http://info.ogp.org.uk/safety/
Disclaimer
Whilst every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the information contained in this publication, neither the OGP nor any of its members past present or future warrants its accuracy or will, regardless of its or their negligence, assume liability for any foreseeable or unforeseeable use made thereof, which liability is hereby excluded. Consequently, such use is at the recipient's own risk on the basis that any use by the recipient constitutes agreement to the terms of this disclaimer. The recipient is obliged to inform any subsequent recipient of such terms.
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